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Abstract 
This paper aims to quantify the impact of the minimum wage on labor market perfor-
mance in the Czech Republic. Using regional data for 1995–2004, it estimates the effect 
of the minimum wage adjusted for the regional wage differential on regional unem-
ployment. Consequently, using detailed individual data from 2004/2005, we analyze 
the annual hikes in the minimum wage, which allow us to estimate employment proba-
bilities for workers with a wage level at, or close to, the new minimum wage. The aim is 
to reveal whether the most endangered groups of workers exhibited significantly different 
subsequent employment probabilities. Our results reveal that the minimum wage has had 
a significant impact in terms of increasing regional unemployment and reducing the em-
ployment probabilities of low-paid workers. 
1. Introduction 
Almost all the developed countries use some form of wage legislation that 
prevents wages falling below a  certain threshold.
1  Indeed, several conventions of 
the  International Labor Organization recommend the  minimum wage concept as 
an instrument of workers’ protection.
2 However, the minimum wage and its econom-
ic consequences have traditionally been at the center of both academic and political 
discussions and the subject of many controversies.
  
On the one hand, proponents of the minimum wage mostly seek arguments in 
the social area. The main stated goals of the minimum wage are usually to reduce (or 
prevent) poverty, to decrease income inequality, to improve the living conditions of 
low-paid workers, and to make “work pay.” Indeed, certain positive employment con-
* This paper was written with the support of the Grant Agency of Charles University, Grant No. 2199/2007
(“Analysis of the Impact of the Selected Social Policy Instruments on the Czech Labour Market and
a Broad International Comparison”) and of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, Grant No. 403/
/08/1369 (“Individuals and Households in the Czech Republic: Transformation Changes and Cross-
-National Comparison”) and Grant No. 402/08/0501 (“Political Economics of Public Budgets”). The au-
thors wish to thank Michaela Erbenová (International Monetary Fund, Washington) and Ondřej Schneider
(Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University in Prague, CESifo, Munich, and Georgetown Uni-
versity) for their helpful comments and advice. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The minimum wage can be either statutory, established by the government, or set as an extension of 
collective bargaining agreements. Many “old” European countries do not have a legally binding minimum 
wage, but usually there exists an effective minimum wage determined by collective bargaining (Austria,
Italy, Germany, Denmark, Sweden). The Czech Republic, on the other hand, has a statutory minimum 
wage, similarly to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (for more details see Eurostat, 2007). 
2 Czech Republic has ratified two out of the  three conventions recommending the  introduction of 
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sequences of the minimum wage have been reported, for instance by Dickens et al. 
(1999), Card and Krueger (1995), and Dolado et al. (1999). Also, Lee (1999) showed 
a positive effect of the minimum wage in terms of decreasing income differentiation. 
Card (1992) and Bazen and Martin (1991) indicated a positive effect in terms of in-
creasing the wages of young workers.  
However, the  potential of the  minimum wage in the  fight against general 
poverty is rather limited. Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (1996) state that it is 
mainly higher-income households who profit from the minimum wage. Borjas (2005) 
confirms this result and estimates that only 19% of the increase in incomes resulting 
from the growing minimum wage between 1989 and 1992 was registered in poor 
households. As indicated by OECD (1998) in its study on nine developed coun- 
tries in 1993, the majority (60–90%) of low-paid workers paid below two thirds of 
the  wage median lived in medium- or high-income households. On the  contrary, 
the proportion of low-paid workers living in the poorest households was around 10% 
only. Thus, the minimum wage does not seem to be an efficient instrument for pre-
venting general poverty.
3 
On the other hand, there are significant critics of the minimum wage, who 
stress the potential adverse impacts on the labor costs of firms and unemployment 
among the least productive workers (Deere, Murphy, and Welch, 1995; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2003; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Bazen and Martin, 1991). 
From a similar perspective, the OECD in its Jobs Strategy (1994) emphasizes the al-
location function of wages in providing essential information regarding employment 
opportunities. In this sense, wage flexibility is of particular importance. However, 
flexibility might be reduced as soon as the minimum wage level becomes binding, 
resulting in negative effects on employment.  
Economic theorists have not reached a broad consensus regarding the conse-
quences of the minimum wage so far. Nevertheless, on the microeconomic level it is 
usually generally accepted that although it might have some positive impact on 
the motivation to increase productivity among low-paid workers (Stigler, 1946; Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 1998; Cubitt and Hargreaves-Heap, 1999; Cahuc and Michell, 
1996), on shifting the employment composition toward high-wage jobs (Acemoglu, 
2001), as a motivational device in the efficient wages framework (Rebitzer and 
Taylor, 1995; Manning, 1995), or in the case of a monopsony (Card and Krueger, 
1995)
4, there exists a threshold over which the negative effects of the minimum wage 
tend to prevail. The minimum wage then increases unemployment and causes eco-
nomic losses in terms of efficiency. The effect is considered stronger for particular 
groups of workers with the lowest productivity, especially the youngest and the least 
experienced. The  situation is confirmed to some extent by the  existing empirical 
3 Exact estimations for the Czech Republic are not available. For details on the effect of the minimum 
wage on poor households’ incomes in the Czech Republic see Fialová (2007). 
4 The research of Card and Krueger, published in several studies, was based on a natural experiment and 
examined employment patterns in the fast-food industry given the changes in minimum wage tariffs in 
several states of the  US. The  results indicate some positive employment effect of the  minimum wage 
in this segment. However, the approach was largely criticized by several authors, based on inappropriate
methodology, misleading interpretation of data, and insufficient theoretical and empirical rationale
(Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Neumark and Wascher, 2000; Dolado et al., 1996; Brown, 1999), resulting 
in an extensive academic debate on this topic. In the end, the controversy did not lead to any consensus.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           257 
research. For a summary of the empirical research results on this issue, see for ex-
ample Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) or OECD (1998).
5  
The employment and unemployment effects of the minimum wage also de-
pend on the structure of the labor market. In a competitive environment, a hike in 
the minimum wage results in employment cuts, growth of unemployment, and higher 
wages for those who retain their jobs.
6 On the other hand, under a monopsonistic 
market structure, a hike in the minimum wage need not have any disemployment 
effects and, up to some level, would simply raise the wage level of the employed and 
the stock of employment itself. However, industries with high shares of low-paid 
workers have traditionally been considered rather competitive (the food industry, 
the textile industry, the wood-processing industry, agriculture, construction, etc.; see 
also Stigler, 1946). Furthermore, these industries might be characterized by higher 
elasticity of labor demand (according to the Hicks-Marshall rules of derived demand, 
see Hicks, 1932) implying larger employment reductions in reaction to an increasing 
price of labor. Also, the growing mobility of labor makes the concept of monopsony 
problematic and its application to the Czech situation rather limited. The prevailing 
adverse effect of the  minimum wage in low-wage industries was also confirmed 
by the research of Buchtíková (1995) – see below. Therefore, the competitive model 
seems more appropriate for describing the effects of the minimum wage in the Czech 
environment.  
On the macroeconomic level, the major impact of the minimum wage can be 
identified in its effect on the entire relative wage distribution. By restricting the (le-
gal) incomes of workers below the  statutory tariff, the  minimum wage tends to 
increase the proportion of workers paid exactly at, or slightly over, its level. This 
spike in the minimum wage level and the spillover effects on wages above the min-
imum has been identified by several studies (for a  summary, see Neumark and 
Wascher, 2008, or OECD, 1998). The  minimum wage compresses the  wage dis-
tribution in such way and, hence, damages the relative wage status of better-paid 
workers. Moreover, this situation ultimately leads to losses in overall economic 
5 Apart from influencing labor market performance directly, the minimum wage might have additional in-
direct effects due to its interaction with other institutions and policies. A binding minimum wage might, 
for instance, amplify the adverse unemployment effects of labor taxation by preventing tax shifting to
workers (see for instance Bassanini and Duval, 2006). The  relatively high level of labor taxation in 
the Czech Republic (see Fialová and Schneider, 2009) might, therefore, play an important role in this 
respect. Furthermore, a rising minimum wage might also have substantial fiscal implications in terms of
reducing tax evasion in a competitive environment characterized by underreporting of earnings by em-
ployed labor (for details see Tonin, 2007).  
6  The adverse effect of the minimum wage on employment might, however, be at least partially offset by 
increased employment in the  grey economy (dualistic economy model). The  informal sector is where 
workers dismissed in the formal sector go to
 seek employment opportunities. At the same time, increased 
flows of workers into the grey economy tend to reduce the wage level prevailing there.
 Hence, the con-
sequences of minimum wage hikes are much more complex in such case. Still, the evidence on the impact 
of the  minimum wage on the  informal sector is rather mixed. Some studies, mostly in Brazil, found 
positive wage and negative employment effects in accordance with the neoclassical theory of competitive 
labor markets, while others found negative wage and positive employment effects in the informal sector 
in accordance
 with the dualistic economy framework (for a summary of
 the literature on this topic see 
Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006). Estimations of the impact of a rising minimum wage in the formal 
sector on wages and employment in the informal sector in the Czech Republic are not available. The share 
of the grey economy in the Czech Republic has recently been estimated very broadly at around 3–30% of 
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efficiency, and some authors also mention it as one of the causes of the European 
labor market hysteresis (see, for example, Krugman, 1994). 
The Czech Republic introduced a minimum wage in 1991 as part of sweeping 
labor market reforms. The minimum wage in the Czech Republic exhibited dynamic 
growth as from the late-1990s, slackening somewhat after 2003. Yet the empirical 
evidence on the  economic consequences of the  minimum wage in the  Czech Re-
public is rather limited. The first analysis was conducted by Buchtíková (1995) on 
the early-1990s data. The author carried out a simulation to show the effects of wage 
growth driven by minimum wage hikes on employment and the wage distribution 
in firms. The results indicate that increasing the minimum wage does not necessarily 
result in higher unemployment. The negative effect would be more apparent in par-
ticular industries (textiles, machinery, wood-processing, foods) and groups of work-
ers (the young, women, part-time workers). However, the data covered state-owned 
enterprises only and the simulations used parameter estimates that were not based 
on Czech data. Hence, the interpretative power of the results is rather limited.  
Gottvald, Hančlová, and Pytlikova (2002) examined the effects of the mini-
mum wage on employment and the  wage distribution in the  Czech Republic in 
the period 1998–2002. The authors indicated a significant positive effect of the mini-
mum wage on wages in the given period, although the magnitude of the effect di-
minishes as one moves up the wage scale. The effect on unemployment proved to be 
rather low and was not statistically significant, as in the  study of Buchtíková. 
Nevertheless, this study can again be criticized as far as the technical correctness 
of  the  analysis is concerned. Still, similar results were reported by Eriksson and 
Pytlikova (2004) in their study on data for the same period. They evaluate the effect 
of the minimum wage on wages as positive in general, while the impact on employ-
ment is ambiguous. The employment effect was even positive in the case of large 
companies employing a large share of low-paid workers (the authors attribute this 
result to increased motivation stemming from a  growing minimum wage and its 
distance from the subsistence minimum); on the other hand, minimum wage hikes 
had negative consequences in small businesses. 
Therefore, based on the results of previous economic research in the Czech 
environment, we can expect some positive effects of the minimum wage on the wage 
level of workers (i.e., those who sustain their job even after a minimum wage hike) 
and, consequently, perhaps also on the motivation of the unemployed or inactive to 
find a  job. However, their chance of being hired might be reduced as a result of 
increased costs of firms in employing low-productive workers. There is no clear con-
sensus in the existing research regarding what the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment and unemployment in the Czech environment would be.
7 In this context, 
this paper is concerned with the impact of the minimum wage on employment and 
unemployment in the Czech Republic. 
7 Research has also been carried out into the effects of the minimum wage in other transition economies. 
Hinnosar and Rõõm (2003) examined the  consequences of the  minimum wage setting in Estonia and 
concluded that minimum wage growth in the 1990s resulted in a drop in employment among workers paid 
below and slightly over the new minimum wage. Kertesi and Köllõ (2003) studied the impact of the mini-
mum wage in Hungary. Their results show that the almost 100% hike in the minimum wage tariff that took 
place in 2001/2 significantly increased labor costs, reduced employment in small firms, and had an adverse 
effect on job retention and job-finding probabilities of low-paid workers. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           259 
 
Using regional data for 1995–2004 and individual data for 2004/2005 we aim 
to find out whether the  minimum wage did indeed influence labor market per-
formance. More precisely, on the regional level, we estimate the effect of the mini-
mum wage adjusted for the regional wage differential on regional unemployment. 
Consequently, using detailed individual data from the Statistics on Income and Liv-
ing Conditions database we analyze the  annual hikes in the  minimum wage and 
categorize workers into several groups based on their wage level relative to the mini-
mum wage. We focus on workers whose wage in period t was lower or marginally 
higher than the new minimum wage in period t+1, and estimate the subsequent em-
ployment probabilities in period t+1. We aim to reveal whether the most endangered 
groups of workers exhibited significantly different employment probabilities. Based 
on our results we aim to reveal whether the minimum wage has had any adverse 
effect on Czech labor market performance.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
the  development of the  minimum wage in the  Czech Republic and puts it into 
a broader economic and social context. Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of the ef-
fects of the minimum wage on unemployment on the regional level. Section 4 pre-
sents an analysis of the consequences of the minimum wage on the individual level 
and depicts the methodology for the employment equation estimations and the model. 
The main results and discussion are summarized in section 5.  
2. The Minimum Wage and Its Socioeconomic Consequences in the Czech Rep.  
The minimum wage was introduced in the Czech Republic in 1991 together 
with a system of minimum wage tariffs fixing the minimum wage rates for particular 
occupations and strengthening the  impact of the  minimum wage in the  economy.
8 
Sub-minimum wage tariffs for the young and the disabled supplemented the system 
to eliminate potential negative employment effects. The basic minimum wage rate 
was initially set relatively high, at CZK 2,000, or 50% of the average wage. How-
ever, its nominal level was not adjusted considerably until the  late 1990s. Con-
sequently, the  real value of the  minimum wage fell continuously to a  historical 
minimum in 1998, when it reached 63% of the real 1991 value. This development, 
together with a comparison with the average wage level and other economic vari-
ables, is summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
Table 1  Minimum Wage (MW) and Average Wage (AW) in the Czech Republic, 
1991–2008, CZK 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
MW  2 000 2 200 2 200 2 200 2 200 2 500 2 500 2 650 3 425* 
AW  3 792  4 644  6 095  7 226  8 572  10 141  11 132  12 163  13 181 
MW/AW (%)  52.7  47.4  36.1  30.4  25.7  24.7  22.5  21.8  26.0 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
MW  4 250* 5 000 5 700 6 200 6 700 7 185 7 763* 8 000 8 000 
AW  14 029  15 248  16 363  17 443  18 589  19 591  20 855  22 384  24 282 
MW/AW (%)  30.3 32.8 34.8 35.5 36.0 36.7 37.2 35.7 32.9 
Note: * Figure refers to annual average (minimum wage increased in January and July). 
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, Czech Statistical Office. 260                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
 
There were several reasons for this stagnation: the weak position of trade unions 
in the early 1990s; restrictive government income policy introduced in 1991 by a sys-
tem of wage regulation; and last but not least, legal links between the minimum wage 
and the social system. Many social benefits were explicitly linked to the minimum 
wage. In this interrelated political framework, increasing the minimum wage pushed 
up the state’s social expenditure and caused budgetary pressures, making hikes in 
the minimum wage politically unacceptable.  
The slump in the real value of the minimum wage during the 1990s was crit-
icized by many international organizations. The link to the social system was thus 
freed in 1998 and a path toward growth in the minimum wage was opened. The mini-
mum wage started to grow substantially, increasing by 29% in 1999 and by 24% in 
2000. As a result, it reached its real 1991 value in 2001. However, the pace of nomi-
nal growth gradually decelerated (hovering around 8% in the 2003–2006 period) and 
finally stopped in 2008 and 2009, when the minimum wage was not increased at all.  
By law, the minimum wage should follow movements in prices and wages to 
sustain its purchasing power. The real growth of the minimum wage was negative 
until 1998 (with the exception of 1996), as its increments fell short of the high annual 
inflation (see Figure 1). The situation changed in 1999, when the nominal gains in 
the minimum wage markedly exceeded inflation, which slowed (these two figures 
Figure 1  Minimum Wage (MW) and Average Wage (AW), CPI and Labor Productivity 








1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
%
AW - real growth Labour productivity growth CPI growt h MW - nominal growth MW - real growth
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the CR, Czech Statistical Office, authors´ calculations 
8 After the collapse of the central administration of wages at the beginning of the 1990s, the system of 
twelve minimum wage tariffs was initially intended to be temporary and was designed to protect workers
until the system of collective wage bargaining developed to take over this function. The number of tariff 
classes was reduced to three in 1996, fully re-introduced in 2000, and reduced to eight again in 2006 (re-
named the “guaranteed wage” in the new Labor Code). The tariffs are binding on firms with no collective 
agreement. However, even the highest, eighth tariff amounts to less than 80% of the average wage, which 
makes these tariffs a completely ineffective limitation for human-capital intensive occupations. According 
to the OECD, collective bargaining coverage stood at only 27% in the Czech Republic in 2004. Therefore, 
minimum wage tariffs might represent an effective limitation for a significant proportion of firms, mainly 
for less skilled occupations. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           261 
 
roughly equalized in 2007). It is clear that the minimum wage has not followed 
the movements in consumer prices and wages in the Czech Republic, despite the in-
tended interconnection laid down by law. The data also do not show any relation to 
movements in the average wage or labor productivity, as the real minimum wage 
rose relatively faster in periods with lower productivity gains. Thus, it seems that 
the minimum wage developments in the examined period pursued political goals in 
the social area rather than developments in the real economy. 
However, the absolute level of the minimum wage does not reflect its real 
importance and economic consequences. As for economic impact, its position in 
the overall wage distribution is of key importance. This relationship is indicated by 
the Kaitz index, stating the ratio of the statutory minimum wage to the average gross 
wage in the economy (see Figure 2).
9 This ratio was rather high when the minimum 
wage was first introduced: it stood at 53% of the economy-wide average in 1991. 
However, during the 1990s it dropped drastically to a minimum of just 22% in 1998. 
In 1999 it started rising again, and since 2003 the ratio has been broadly stable at 
around 36–37%. Moreover, according to the Czech Statistical Office (2008), the min-
imum wage reached more than two thirds of the value of the first wage decile in 
2007. This might represent a considerable burden for employment of the least-pro-
ductive and lowest-paid workers. 
Figure 2  Minimum Wage (MW) as a Share of Average Wage (AW) and Subsistence 
Minimum (SM) of One- and Four-Member Households in the Czech 















MW/AW (LHS coordinates) netMW/SM1 (RHS ccordinates) netMW/SM4 (RHS ccordinates)  
Note: SM1 = subsistence minimum for an individual household; SM4 = subsistence minimum of a four-member 
household, two adults, two children. 
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, Czech Statistical Office, the authors´ calcu-
lations. 
9 This index might understate the overall impact of minimum wages due to progressivity of tax systems.
Also, the average wage might be highly distorted by shifts in the highest level of the wage distribution, 
without any change in the lowest deciles most influenced by the minimum wage. Thus, the median and 
the net wage might be a better choice for evaluating the economic impact of the minimum wage over time 
or for comparison across countries (OECD, 1998). However, comparable data sources are limited. 262                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
On the other hand, the effects on the motivation of low-paid workers and of 
non-working persons to accept a paid job is indicated by the relation between the net 
minimum wage and the subsistence minimum level, as depicted in Figure 2. The sub-
sistence minimum was introduced later than the minimum wage, as late as the end of 
1991. The movements in
 these two policy instruments were completely independent 
until the late 1990s. The net minimum wage was below the subsistence level of 
a one-member household throughout the 1990s. We can hardly expect the minimum 
wage to meet its goals in motivating low-paid workers in an environment where so-
cial income in inactivity exceeds the potential minimum labor income. The minimum 
wage outpaced the subsistence minimum of a one-member household only in 2000 
and has kept increasing moderately since then. There was a large upward jump of 
the ratio of the minimum wage to the subsistence minimum in 2007, related to social 
reform measures and cuts in social expenditure. Thus, the motivating role of the mini-
mum wage might have been increased by the reforms in 2007. However, its real po-
tential to meet its goals might be limited due to the adverse effects on the motivation 
of employers to hire low-productive workers for pay exceeding their productivity. 
Sometimes, the minimum wage function is perceived not just on an individual 
level, but takes into account the welfare of whole families. According to the ILO
10 
and the  European Social Charter of the  Council of Europe, the  minimum wage 
should represent a level of remuneration that will provide workers and their fami- 
lies with a decent standard of living.
11 Such an approach, however, is not applied in 
the Czech Republic. The minimum wage amounted to roughly 20–30% of the sub-
sistence level of a four-member household between 1991 and 2000 and increased 
slightly to 50% in 2004–2006 – see Figure 2. The surge toward 70% in 2007 is again 
attributable to the  above-mentioned social reform measures. Thus, the  minimum 
wage is based rather on the individual approach in the Czech Republic and does not 
reflect the family concept. 
Despite the substantial increases in the minimum wage in the Czech Republic 
since 1999, it still remains rather low by international comparison. A statutory national 
minimum wage has been introduced in 20 EU member states and ranged from EUR 92 
(Bulgaria) to EUR 1,570 (Luxembourg) in 2007. The Czech Republic with EUR 288 is 
at the low end of the scale, together with most of the other new member countries. All 
three remaining Visegrad countries were below the Czech level with even lower min-
imum wages (for details see Fialová and Schneider, 2009). The rankings do not change 
much after adjusting for differences in price levels, when the differentiation of coun-
tries narrows. The minimum wage expressed in PPS in the EU varied from 204 (Bul-
garia) to 1,503 (Luxembourg) in 2006; the Czech minimum wage went up relatively to 
465, but kept the same relative position among the countries when expressed in EUR.
12 
10 Convention No. 131: Minimum Wage Fixing Convention. 
11 Such a concept was implemented, for instance, by the city of Baltimore, USA, in 1994. Its “living wage”
ordinance requires businesses with city contracts to pay their workers a  wage exceeding the  national 
poverty level for a family of four, which lies significantly above the federal minimum wage. In many 
European countries, the minimum wage is roughly equal to the subsistence minimum of a four-member 
household (for instance France: 100%, Portugal and Ireland: more than 80% – Source: Eurostat and Euro-
pean Commission). 
12 However, as mentioned for example by Dolado et al. (1996), a relatively higher minimum wage level 
does not necessarily mean a larger economic burden. The existence of special sub-minimum wage tariffs 
for more threatened groups can mitigate the adverse effects of a higher minimum wage.Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           263 
If we compare the real economic burden represented by the minimum wage 
when reflecting the different labor productivity and average wage levels across coun-
tries, the minimum wage was about 40% of the average wage in industry and services 
in 2006 in the Czech Republic (Eurostat, 2007). Most of the new member states at-
tained lower shares (the lowest, at just over 30%, were recorded in the Baltic States), 
while most of the older members had higher values (the highest, in Ireland and Lux-
embourg, hovered around 50%). Consequently, the proportion of full-time workers 
earning the minimum wage was rather low in the Czech Republic: 2.3% in 2006, 
while in many countries it exceeded 8% (e.g. France, Luxembourg, Latvia, and Bul-
garia). However, the  proportion of women paid the  minimum wage in the  Czech 
Republic was more than double that of men (3.5% and 1.4% respectively). A larger 
share of women than men on the minimum wage was common in all European coun-
tries except Malta and Hungary. Comparably large differences in these two figures 
were recorded for instance in Luxembourg, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Therefore, 
women are endangered by hikes in the minimum wage generally more than men. 
3. The Impact of the Minimum Wage at the Regional Level 
In this paper, we focus on the potential adverse consequences of the minimum 
wage on labor market performance. This section estimates the  potential negative 
impact of the  minimum wage on unemployment at the  regional level. We utilize 
the differences in average wage levels between the 77 Czech districts.
13 We might 
expect districts with relatively lower average wages to suffer relatively more from 
nation-wide setting of the minimum wage, as it would represent a larger economic 
burden for firms and regional economies. Thus, our assumption is that, as a result of 
the minimum wage affecting regional labor markets, low-wage districts will ceteris 
paribus exhibit a higher rate of unemployment than high-wage districts.  
A similar relationship was reported by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), 
who indicate more pronounced effects of the minimum wage in regions with lower 
average wages. Our hypothesis is consistent with the more general relationship de-
scribed by the concept of the wage curve, explaining the negative relationship be-
tween regional unemployment and the wage level (first formulated by Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1994). In this framework, higher unemployment in a region leads ceteris 
paribus to a lower wage level. In our case, however, the causality runs in the oppo-
site direction. Our approach is generally consistent with the approach and results of 
Galuščák and Münich (2003), who confirm the  existence of the  wage curve in 
the Czech Republic in the period 1996–2001. 
To estimate the burden of the minimum wage we use the ratio of the mini-
mum wage to the  gross average wage in the  district in a  particular year. Indeed, 
the  first brief analysis of the  regional-level data reveals a  positive relationship 
between the  ratio of the  minimum wage to the  average regional wage and the  re-
gional unemployment rate. Districts with a  low wage level registered relatively 
13 The coefficient of variation of average wages among the 77 Czech districts (NUTS-4 level) grew sub-
stantially during the 1990s and has stabilized since 1998 at around 10% (with some volatility). However,
the wage disparities between the regions are much lower than the differences in unemployment: the coef-
ficient of variation of regional unemployment rates has been fluctuating between 40% and 50% since 2000 
(source: Czech Statistical Office and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, the au-
thors´ calculations); for details see Fialová (2008).  264                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
higher rates of unemployment in 2004–2005:
14 the unemployment rate was 11.1% in 
the ten lowest-wage districts (high minimum/average wage ratio), while it was 7.9% 
in the ten highest-wage districts. The correlation coefficient between unemployment 
and the minimum wage as a proportion of the average wage in the districts was posi-
tive and reached 0.3 in 2004–2005. However, to analyze the causal relationship be-
tween the minimum wage and unemployment, we have to use more sophisticated 
models, as follows in the next section.  
3.1 Methodology, Data, and Description of Variables  
To estimate the effect of the minimum wage on regional unemployment more 
consistently, we used generalized least squares regression analysis on panel data. We 
employ data from 77 districts of the Czech Republic (NUTS-4 level) in 1995–2004.
15 
The data sources are the Czech Statistical Office
16 and the unemployment statistics of 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  
To reveal the effect of the minimum wage on unemployment and to control 
simultaneously for other factors of influence, we use the following characteristics of 
the districts. The average yearly unemployment rate (U) is the endogenous variable. 
Among the  explanatory variables, the  ratio of the  nation-wide minimum wage to 
the average regional wage (MWAW) is in first place. According to our assumption 
stated above, we expect a positive effect of this variable on the explanatory variable.  
In our analysis we are limited by the low availability of relevant data on other 
control variables that might also affect the overall unemployment level in the region. 
Some of the data was available for the period 1995–2001 only. Thus, in the initial 
basic analysis we only cover five independent control variables in the period 1995– 
–2004 (model (1)).  
In the basic dataset of model (1) we control for the overall situation and tight-
ness of the regional labor market by including the vacancy rate in the region (VACR). 
The number of self-employed entrepreneurs per 1,000 inhabitants of the region (ENT) 
reflects the  activity of the  regional population; a  higher level of self-employment 
might push regional unemployment down. We also control for the educational level 
of the population in the districts by adding a variable stating the share of the popu-
lation older than 15 years that has attained a tertiary level of educational (TERTIARY). 
Regional unemployment also differs according to the urbanization of the regions, as 
rural regions typically exhibit fewer employment opportunities than urban districts. 
Thus, we also account for the urbanization of the region using the share of inhab-
itants living in cities (URB). As there are significant regional disparities in the Czech 
Republic and the capital Prague is the economic center of the country and the main 
source of economic growth, we also add a variable stating the distance of the regional 
capital from Prague (DIST). 
14 We chose the period 2004–2005 due to data limitations: the data series on wages in the districts (NUTS4) 
end in 2005 and, moreover, there was a break in the methodology of reporting of unemployment by the Min-
istry of Labor and Social Affairs from 2004 on.  
15 Our dataset is limited by the year 2004, as this is the last year when detailed regional statistics on 
the NUTS-4 level were reported by the Czech Statistical Office. Later on, the detailed statistics switched to 
the more aggregated NUTS-3 level, corresponding to the standard general European approach. 
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In the subsequent analysis (model (2)), we narrow the time period to 1995– 
–2001 and add two more explanatory variables to check the robustness of the pre-
vious results. This adjusted dataset also reflects the sector structure of employment 
by covering the  share of the  working labor force employed in the  primary sector 
(EMPA) and the  development of capital construction expenditure in the  region 
(CAPCON), reflecting the trends in the economic development of the region itself.
17  
The regression equation then takes the following form: 
lnUti = α + β1 lnMWAWti + β2 lnVACRt + β3 ENTti + β4 TERTIARYti + 
+ β5 URBti + β6 DISTti + (β7 EMPAti + β8 lnCAPCONti) + εti         (1) 
where ε represents normally distributed residuals with zero mean and constant vari-
ance. In line with the common practice in this type of research, the dependent vari-
able, the ratio of the minimum wage to the average regional wage, and the vacancy 
rate are given in logs. Capital construction expenditure is also given in log form, to 
eliminate a potential source of heteroskedasticity (as the data covers units of different 
size). Expressing the variables as logs allows us to interpret the regression coeffi-
cients as elasticities. We use the random effects regression model employing the gen-
eralized least squares procedure, because the time variability of the variables DIST 
and TERTIARY is zero, and in such case the fixed effects model is not applicable. As 
the data reflect information regarding units of different size, the presence of hetero-
skedasticity is highly probable. Therefore, we use robust estimates of the variance of 
the regression coefficients. Moreover, the residual analyses indicate autocorrelation 
(AR1), so we use econometric procedures that eliminate this effect. Consequently, 
our analysis offers consistent and efficient estimates.
18  
3.2 Results 
The results of our regression models are given in Table 2. In the basic model 
covering the longer time period (model (1.a)), all six explanatory variables proved to 
be significant. The expected effect of the variables was confirmed, with the exception 
of URB and ENT, which indicated a low positive effect on unemployment. Our re-
sults suggest that the impact of self-employment might be ambiguous within the tran-
sition processes that took place in the given period. The effect of urbanization might 
be also more complex: high urbanization has been connected with a higher share of 
an expanding tertiary sector in some districts, but also with a contracting secondary 
sector in other districts. Thus, besides the low-unemployment districts (Prague, Brno, 
Plzeň, etc.), there were also highly urbanized industrial districts of northern Bohemia 
and northern Moravia suffering from restructuring processes and high levels of un-
employment.  
17 The descriptive statistics of the variables are available from the authors upon request. 
18 Chow tests rejected the hypothesis of stability of the regression coefficients among the districts, which puts
some doubt on our approach to the analysis of the data as a panel. However, the Chow test puts rather re-
strictive assumptions on the character of the input data and residuals (e.g. homoskedasticity of residuals; 
for more details see Greene, 2003), which were not fulfilled by the data used. Therefore, we accept the as-
sumption of general homogeneity of the  Czech Republic as regards the  reaction of unemployment to 
the development of various factors of influence due to similar institutional and socio-cultural background. 
Consequently, we proceed to an analysis of the data as a panel. 266                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
 
Therefore, we exclude the variables ENT and URB due to an ambiguous re-
lationship with regional unemployment. This step also significantly improves the ex-
planatory power of the  model in the  case of inter-group variation and decreases 
the overall explanatory power only negligibly. The reduced form of the basic model 
(1.b) contains only four exogenous variables: MWAW, VACR, TERTIARY, and DIST. 
All these variables proved to be significant. The model explains almost 50% of the var-
iation of unemployment in the districts over time. 
Our results for model  (1) indicate that the  ratio of the  minimum wage to 
the average wage in the region has a significant positive effect on regional unem-
ployment. However, the  results are sensitive to the inclusion of the  variable ENT. 
The elasticity of unemployment with respect to MWAW is 0.3–0.7 (depending on 
the inclusion of ENT and URB), i.e., it is positive and lower than one. Furthermore, 
a higher education level of the district’s population and a higher supply of vacancies 
decrease unemployment in the  regions. On the  other hand, a  larger distance from 
Prague yields higher rates of regional unemployment.  
If we add two more variables and narrow the time period (model (2.a)) we get 
similar results. Again, the results are sensitive to the inclusion of ENT, which influ-
Table 2  Regression Estimation Results – Regional Data Analysis
   Model (1.a)  Model (1.b)  Model (2.a)  Model (2.b)  Model (2.c) 
Constant  -1.022***  -0.510  -1.031*  -0.328  -0.176 
  (0.315)  (0.334)  (0.511)  (0.544)  (0.404) 
lnMWAW  0.314***  0.724***  0.391***  0.652***  0.639*** 
  (0.072)  (0.082)  (0.093)  (0.107)  (0.105) 
lnVACR  -0.113***  -0.209***  -0.158***  -0.256***  -0.256*** 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
ENT  0.011***    0.012***     
  (0.001)    (0.001)     
TERTIARY  -0.164***  -0.074***  -0.159***  -0.084***  -0.087*** 
  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
URB  0.015***    0.019***     
  (0.003)    (0.004)     
DIST  0.003***  0.002***  0.003***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
EMPA      0.014*  0.005   
      (0.008)  (0.008)   
lnCAPCON      -0.088**  0.006   
      (0.037)  (0.041)   
N (districts, time):  770 (77, 10)  770 (77, 10)  539 (77, 7)  539 (77, 7)  539 (77, 7) 
R
2 overall:  0.475  0.451  0.430  0.389  0.402 
R
2 within:  0.758  0.525  0.764  0.445  0.441 
R
2 between:  0.274  0.427  0.248  0.406  0.429 
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
Random effects generalized least squares estimation method, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, Czech Statistical Office, the authors´ cal-
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ences the explanatory power of the model and the regression coefficients and their 
significance. After excluding ENT and URB (model (2.b)), EMPA (which in the orig-
inal model (2.a) was significant only at the 10% level) and CAPCON become in-
significant and consequently were excluded, too.  
The final, reduced model (2.c) leaves us with four explanatory variables, again 
as in model (1.b), which are significant and show a similar effect on the endogenous 
variable as in the  basic model (1.b). The  model explains 40% of the  variation of 
unemployment in the districts over time. MWAW shows a significant positive effect 
in all the models (2.a–c), but its magnitude slightly alters according to the control 
variables covered. The elasticity of regional unemployment with respect to the ratio 
of the minimum wage to the average wage in the region is 0.4–0.6.  
Overall, our results indicate that since 1995, the increasing minimum wage 
expressed as a ratio to the average regional wage has had a significant upward effect 
on the unemployment rate in the regions. However, the elasticity estimates are not 
robust, are sensitive to the inclusion of particular variables, and amount to 0.3–0.7. 
This means that increasing the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in 
the region by 1% leads to a rise in unemployment of 0.3–0.7%.  
An increase in the MWAW ratio occurs if the minimum wage grows faster 
than the average wage. In 2001, for instance, the minimum wage rate went up by 
18%. Therefore, if the average wage growth in a region did not exceed this level, 
we can expect that the minimum wage increase led to higher unemployment in that 
region. Looking at the data from 2001, we find that average wage growth was indeed 
below minimum wage growth: wages grew by more than 10% in five districts only 
(Ostrava, Kutná Hora, Kladno, Jihlava, and Beroun) and by more than the  18% 
threshold in a single district only (Kutná Hora). Thus, in all the regions but one, 
we can expect an adverse effect on unemployment. We can also expect the districts 
where the MWAW ratio increased most rapidly between 1995 and 2004 to be nega-
tively affected the most. Indeed, eight out of the ten districts which exhibited more 
than 55% growth in MWAW in the given period recorded considerably above-average 
levels of unemployment in 2004.
19 
Our results indicate a  significant adverse effect of the  minimum wage on 
regional unemployment. However, the  aggregate district-level data reflect a  large 
spectrum of factors and we cannot attribute a substantial part of the differences in 
unemployment to the effect of the minimum wage only. To estimate the labor market 
impact of the  minimum wage more precisely, we supplement our approach with 
an analysis of the individual-level data. 
4. The Impact of the Minimum Wage on the Individual Level 
In this section, we estimate the  potential negative impact of the  minimum 
wage on employment on the individual level. Our analysis stems from an assumption 
based on the theory of competitive markets: if the productivity of workers remains 
the same, hikes in the nominal wage render workers originally paid a wage between 
the old and new minima currently unemployable.  
19 High unemployment levels were registered in Karviná (21.1%), Frýdek-Místek (15.2%), Sokolov (13.5%),
Hodonín (15.2%), Třebíč (13.6%), Louny (16.1%), Chomutov (18.1%), and Karlovy Vary (11%). On the other
hand, low, below-average unemployment was sustained in Písek (8.2%) and Tábor (6.5%). The country av-
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We use the hike in the minimum wage from 2004 (t) to 2005 (t+1) to identify 
the groups of individuals most endangered by this provision. In first place are work-
ers paid at a level right between the old and new statutory minima. Second, due to 
significant spill-over effects (OECD 1998), workers originally paid marginally over 
the new minimum might also be hit. We suppose that these two groups of individuals 
have significantly lower probabilities of staying employed after the hike in the mini-
mum wage takes place. Therefore, we compare the conditional probabilities of being 
employed full time in period t+1  given full-time employment status in period t, 
p(et+1=1|et=1) for these groups of individuals with those for individuals who were 
paid well above the new statutory minimum in reference period t. In our approach we 
use logistic regression to estimate the conditional probabilities.  
In our analysis we employ a similar approach to that of Abowd et al. (1997). 
However, given the character of the data applied (a cross-sectional sample with par-
tial information on two time periods) we do not employ the standard panel data anal-
ysis customarily used for minimum wage research on individual data. Therefore, we 
partially adjust the approach to our specific circumstances; the adjustment does not 
call into question the theoretical relevance. 
4.1 Methodology, Data, and Variables 
The household survey European Union-Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions (EU-SILC) data was employed.
20 The reference period for the income vari-
ables,  t, is the  year 2004; the  majority of the  other variables relate to the  current 
situation at the time of the survey, t+1, which means Q2 2005. The data provide us 
with yearly net wages; net monthly earned income was therefore constructed ac-
cording to the number of months worked.  
The original data set includes 10,333 individuals (8,628 aged 16 and over) in 
4,351 households. In our study, only individuals 16 to 64 years old are considered. 
We cover only those individuals who reported full-time employment in the last four 
months of the reference period t and part-time employment, full-time employment, 
unemployment, retirement, or out of labor force status in period t+1.
21 Part-time 
employees in the income reference period are excluded since their monthly income is 
not comparable with full-time workers’ wages. Furthermore, the self-employed are 
eliminated since their income contains irregularities which would make the analysis 
biased. We also exclude individuals reporting a wage below the minimum wage. In 
addition, we eliminate individuals who received any sickness benefits in 2004 as this 
biases their wage considerably.  
In other words, only individuals who moved between full-time employment in 
period t and full-time employment, part-time employment, unemployment, retire-
ment, and inactivity during period t+1 are included. This leaves us with 3,070 in-
20 EU-SILC UDB 2005-version 2 of June 2007. EU-SILC is a new panel survey which replaced the ECHP 
survey in 2004. It is a harmonized survey compulsory for all EU member states. Information is collected at
both household level (mainly information on living conditions) and individual level (e.g. individual and
job characteristics, wages, income, social allowances). 
21 We limit our reference period to four months only, because covering the whole of 2004 would be too 
restrictive. The four-month period also excludes those employed in a probation period only (the probation 
period generally lasts three months in the Czech Republic).  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           269 
dividuals. Individual weights were included to reflect the  number of people in 
the whole population who are represented by the particular individual. 
Logistic regression is used for the computations since the endogenous variable 
in the model is dichotomous. This variable is being employed full time in the current 
period t+1 (Q2 2005, i.e., lagged by 4 to 6 months with respect to the income refer-
ence period t) and takes the value of 1 if the individual was employed full time and 0 
if she/he is a  part-time employee, unemployed, retired, or out of the  labor force. 
The logistic model takes the following for 
                                ln [p/(1-p)] = β0 + βi Xi,                                         (2) 
where p is the probability of staying employed in t+1 conditional on employment in t 
p(et+1=1|et=1) and vector Xi includes all the explanatory variables. The explanatory 
variables included in equation (2) were the individuals’ minimum wage status, age, 
education, sex, occupational category, and region as a proxy for general trends in 
the unemployment rate.
22 
The minimum wage status (MWST_j) is the individual’s position in the wage 
distribution given their relation to the net minimum wage in t and t+1. MWST_1 
represents those employees receiving a wage higher than the minimum wage in t yet 
not exceeding the  minimum wage in t+1 (“between” employees). MWST_2 re-
presents those employees who were paid marginally over the minimum wage in t+1 
(“marginally over” employees). Therefore, the thresholds are represented by the net 
minimum wage in 2004 (CZK 5,459) and 2005 (CZK 5,819) and 1.5 times the 2005 
level for the interval “marginally over”. The thresholds were adjusted for individuals 
aged 16–21 according to their sub-minimum wage tariffs. We also adjust the  in-
tervals for errors in measurement (± 10%). The intervals are defined as follows: 
 – MWST_1 – “between”: 
CZK 4,900 (MWt*0.9) < monthly net wage in t < CZK 6,400 (MWt+1*1.1); 
 – MWST_2 – “marginally over”: 
CZK 6,400 (MWt+1*1.1) ≤ monthly net wage in t < CZK 8,700 (MWt+1*1.5); 
 – MWST_3 – “considerably over” (reference variable): 
CZK 8,700 (MWt+1*1.5) ≤ monthly net wage in t. 
AGEk are dummies for age, reflecting also work experience. The reference 
group is age 35–44. The  education variable (TER_EDUC) corresponds to tertiary 
education.
23 MALE is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the individual is male. 
ISCOl are variables classifying occupation according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations. The  reference group is ISCO9 (elementary occu-
pations). REGm are dummies for region as a proxy for unemployment rates. The re-
gions on the  NUTS-2 level were clustered into four groups given the  level of 
unemployment to reflect the  labor market situation in the  region where the  in-
dividuals live. The reference group is the Prague region.
24 
22 Descriptive statistics of the variables are available from the authors upon request.
23 The dummy on primary education was excluded due to a lack of relevant observations. 
24 REG2 consists of South-West, Central Bohemia, and North-East, REG3 consists of South-East and Cen-
tral Moravia, and REG4 consists of North-West and Moravia-Silesia.270                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
 
4.2 Results 
The results of the maximum likelihood logit estimation procedure are reported 
in Table 3. The results show that workers whose 2004 wage lies between the 2004 
and 2005 minima or marginally over the 2005 minimum have substantially lower 
subsequent employment probabilities in 2005 than workers whose wage in 2004 
exceeds the new 2005 minimum considerably. The differences proved to be statis-
tically significant. Moreover, the  hike in the  minimum wage hits the  “between” 
workers much harder than the  workers paid “marginally over”: the  coefficient of 
the “between” workers group is much lower than that of the “marginally over” group. 
Furthermore, the age and occupational variables proved to be relevant in explaining 
conditional employment probabilities: the  probability of subsequent employment 
falls significantly in groups aged 55–59 and 60–64 (the effect of retirement) and in 
ISCO group 0 – armed forces (this relates to huge withdrawals from the army and 
the  police service in connection with the  screening law and the  new civil service 
law). 
The employment probabilities resulting from the model have to be considered 
in relation to the relevant reference variable, which here consists of workers paid 
considerably more than the new minimum (more than 1.5 times the 2005 minimum 
wage net value). The odds ratio of the reference variable equals 1. When an indi-
Table 3  Regression Estimation Results – Individual Data Analysis
  Coeff.  S.E.  Odds ratio 
MWST_1  -1.8642***  (0.3565)  0.1550 
mwst_2  -0.7724**  (0.3090)  0.4619 
male  0.4318  (0.2801)  1.5400 
age16_21  -0.3995  (0.6021)  0.6707 
age22_25  0.2824  (0.5775)  1.3264 
age26_34  -0.2547  (0.3652)  0.7752 
age45_54  0.3619  (0.4081)  1.4361 
age55_59  -1.2781***  (0.3896)  0.2786 
age60_64  -2.1715***  (0.5138)  0.1140 
ter_educ  -0.5694  (0.4587)  0.5658 
ISCO0  -2.8734***  (0.8819)  0.0565 
ISCO1  1.0208  (1.3588)  2.7753 
ISCO23  0.4164  (0.5217)  1.5165 
ISCO45  -0.1057  (0.4590)  0.8997 
ISCO67  -0.1811  (0.4722)  0.8343 
ISCO8  -0.6131  (0.4904)  0.5417 
reg2  0.1019  (0.4421)  1.1072 
reg3  0.3337  (0.4752)  1.3961 
reg4  -0.2523  (0.4568)  0.7770 
Constant  4.2184  (0.6373)  67.9245 
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level. Equation estimated by maximum likelihood logit. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size: 3,070. Correctness of observation classification 97.5%. 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005–version 2 of June 2007; the authors´ calculations. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                           271 
vidual exhibits the  minimum wage status “between” (MWST_1), his employment 
probability decreases substantially: the odds ratio amounts to a very low 0.16 (see 
Table 3). Furthermore, for workers with a minimum wage status “marginally over” 
the new minimum wage (MWST_2), the odds ratio increases slightly to 0.46 but is 
still well below one.  
This means that if we compare two otherwise completely identical individ-
uals, the first one paid between the old and new minima, and the second whose net 
wage exceeds the new minimum considerably, the first one will be 0.16 times as 
likely to remain employed after the minimum wage hike compared to the second one. 
The drop in the employment probability of a worker paid marginally over the new 
minimum is 0.46. The  results therefore affirm our initial assumption and prove 
the negative effect of the minimum wage on the employment probability of low-paid 
workers. The  strength of this effect diminishes as one moves up the  wage dis-
tribution. 
Despite the substantial negative effect estimated, the first of the at-risk groups 
is relatively small: workers in the “between” group comprise 5.2% of the sample 
only. On the other hand, workers in the “marginally over” group account for more – 
18.5% – of the sample, and the adverse effects might be larger in scope. However, as 
is usually assumed in the empirical literature, the differences in the age averages of 
the groups are not statistically significant and so the adverse effects are not limited to 
young workers only. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to quantify the  impact of the  minimum wage on labor 
market performance in the  Czech Republic. There have been substantial hikes in 
the minimum wage since the late 1990s. The movements in minimum wage tariffs, 
however, have not reflected the trends in the real economy and have mainly been 
a result of political measures in the social area. Despite the rapid growth, the Czech 
Republic remains among the more liberal countries in the EU as regards the relative 
importance of the minimum wage in the economic environment.  
Our analyses suggest that the minimum wage does have significant adverse 
consequences for labor market performance. Using regional data for 1995–2004, 
we estimate the effect of varying the economic burden represented by the  ratio of 
the minimum wage to the average regional wage on regional unemployment. Our 
results indicate that since 1995, the increasing minimum wage expressed as a share 
of the  average regional wage has had a  significant upward effect on the  unem-
ployment rate in the regions. The elasticity estimates amount to 0.3–0.7; however, 
they are not robust and are sensitive to the inclusion of particular variables. This 
means that increasing the  ratio of the  minimum wage to the  average wage in 
the  region by 1% leads to a  rise in unemployment of 0.3–0.7%. However, when 
interpreting the  results, the  low robustness of the  estimates must be taken into 
account.  
Consequently, using detailed individual data for 2004/2005, we use the annual 
hikes in the  statutory minimum wage to identify workers whose wage falls “be-
tween” the  old and the  new minimum wage level and “marginally over” the  new 
minimum wage. We estimate the  subsequent employment probabilities of these 272                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
workers compared to workers whose wage exceeds the new minimum considerably. 
Our results show that when a worker exhibits the minimum wage status “between” in 
2004, his/her subsequent employment probability in 2005 decreases substantially: 
he/she is 0.16 times as likely to remain employed after the  minimum wage hike 
compared to a worker paid considerably over the minimum. Furthermore, for work-
ers who are “marginally over” the new minimum wage, the difference in probability 
increases slightly to 0.46, but is still well below one. The results therefore affirm our 
initial assumption and prove the negative effect of the minimum wage on the em-
ployment probability of low-paid workers. The strength of this effect diminishes as 
one moves up the wage distribution. 
The potential of the minimum wage in fighting poverty is generally rather 
limited, as the  empirical literature on this topic shows. Given its proven adverse 
effects on unemployment in regions and the employment probabilities of low-paid 
workers, it seems valid to claim that the minimum wage in the Czech Republic has 
not been a very useful or effective instrument so far. Instead, alternative measures for 
motivating low-paid workers (e.g. negative income tax) without adverse effects on 
employment should be considered together with direct provisions aimed at enhancing 
the human capital of the least productive workers.  
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